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The creation of the European Monetary Union has led to a substantial increase in 
the discussion of the importance of fiscal discipline and adequate fiscal rules in such a 
monetary union. The “European” solution has been challenged by many authors and 
politicians: among the main questions discussed in recent years, we find the use of the 
same  rules  for  different  situations  in  Member-Countries,  particularly  in  terms  of 
economic dimension and economic level of development. 
We develop a model of a monetary union between two countries that may differ in 
economic dimension and in the level of development. By solving transitional dynamics 
towards  the  steady  state  through  numerical  computation,  the  model  allows  us  to 
examine the impact of fiscal shocks that may lead to excessive deficits. 
Our results suggest that the implications of such deficits depend on whether they 
occur in the small and less developed country or in the big and more developed one. In 
this context, we argue that an excessive deficit should be temporarily allowed in the 
case  of  the  small  and  less  developed  country,  in  order  to  improve  economic 
convergence and wages within the union. 
Keywords: Monetary Union; SGP; Excessive Deficits; Technological-Knowledge Gap; 
Numerical Computation. 
JEL Classification: C61, E62, H6, O3 
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1. Introduction 
With  the  creation  of  the  European  Monetary  Union  (EMU),  the  framework  for  the 
definition  and  implementation  of  macroeconomic  policies  has  dramatically  changed. 
Member-Countries have lost their exchange rate and money supply instruments and the 
use of budgetary measures has been restrained by binding rules aimed at avoiding the 
creation and maintenance of excessive public deficits. 
The need for fiscal discipline, in a context where fiscal policies stood at national 
level,  was  justified  by  the  potential  external  negative  effects  that  could  result  from 
excessive deficits run by any participant in the eurozone. These effects (e.g., De Grauwe, 
2005) included a possible increase in the interest rate of the EMU, leading to possible 
pressures  on  the  European  Central  Bank  (ECB)  to  implement  a  more  expansionist 
monetary policy, thus leading to an increase in inflation. Fundamentally, European fiscal 
rules have been put in place because of the need to keep price stability (e.g., Baldwin and 
Wyplosz, 2004). 
The above-mentioned rules included a maximum ceiling for the deficit to GDP ratio 
(3%) and for the public debt to GDP ratio (60%) and were consecrated by the Maastricht 
Treaty (1992). Further, the need for fiscal discipline has been improved by the rules of the 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), which assumed a budgetary equilibrium (or even a small 
budgetary superavit) as the fundamental goal in terms of the medium-run, considering it 
the adequate way to preserve some margin for manoeuvre for fiscal policy in the case of a 
negative shock. The SGP went further on fiscal discipline, establishing concrete sanctions 
to be applied to countries that maintain excessive deficits and do not comply with Council 
recommendations (European Council, 1997). 
Since the beginning, these rules have been the main object of discussion among 
academics and politicians with regard to fiscal policy in the eurozone. Positions vary from 
those who support them, possibly calling for small changes (e.g., Buti and Giudice, 2002;   2 
Begg et al., 2004; Buti et al., 2005), to those who would prefer a federalisation of fiscal 
policy (e.g., Goodhart, 1990) or, if not possible, an important degree of autonomy for 
every national fiscal policy (e.g., Buiter et al., 1993; Maillet, 1992), and to those who, 
strongly supporting the case for fiscal discipline, require major reforms for the rules set in 
the case of the EMU (e.g., Casella, 1999; Buiter and Grafe, 2002; Pisani-Ferry, 2004; 
Wyplosz, 2005). 
Among the arguments put forward in favour of major changes in the original SGP,
1 
we find the idea that fiscal rules would differ according to the level of development of the 
Member-Countries and their economic dimension. 
On the one hand, the goal of economic and social cohesion would require stronger 
rates of the real product in the less developed countries, which in turn would require 
stronger public intervention and would be compatible with temporary public deficit and 
debt ratios higher than those proposed in the SGP. Moreover, several authors (including 
Mills and Quinet, 2001; Brunila, 2002; or Creel, 2003) have suggested the substitution of 
current rules for the “golden rule”, allowing the creation of public debt to face public 
investment expenses, or the introduction of rules concerning public expenses (and not 
strictly the public deficit). In particular, some expenses related to public investment would 
be excluded from the calculus of the relevant public deficit concerning the application of 
the “3 per cent” rule. 
On the other hand, the above mentioned external spillovers resulting from excessive 
deficits would vary according to the economic dimension of the country. It would be 
expected that only big countries, such as Germany, would affect financial markets and 
price stability in a relevant way. 
                                                
1 For a more complete description of the critics and doubts concerning the European fiscal rules, see, for 
instance, Buiter et al., 1993, and, for a recent assessment, Buiter, 2005.   3 
The debate is not yet closed, but it may already have made a relevant contribution to 
the recent SGP reform (European Council, 2005), which may have made European fiscal 
rules  more  flexible.
2  In  particular,  the  “new”  SGP  allows  for  a  growing  number  of 
circumstances  that  lead  to  a  non-automatic  application  of  the  sanctions,  namely 
considering a diversified kind of public expenses that may justify the non-compliance to 
the “3 per cent” rule. As far as the present paper is concerned, it is relevant to note that, 
within that set, expenses regarding R&D are included. 
In order to analyse whether or not such kind of public expenses should be treated 
differently and whether or not European fiscal rules should differ between countries, we 
consider  a  standard  economic  structure  in  endogenous  R&D-growth  theory,  for  two 
countries that compose a monetary union. In each country, the production of perfectly 
competitive  final  goods  uses  institutions  and  labour  together  with  a  continuum  set  of 
country  specific  quality-adjusted  intermediate  goods.  Intermediate  goods,  in  turn,  use 
designs (resulting from R&D activities) under monopolistic competition. The production 
function,  in  which  the  complementarity  of  inputs,  in  each  country,  is  coupled  with 
substitutability between countries, is adapted from the horizontal R&D growth models 
developed by Kiley (1999) and Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001). 
As a result of the close relationship between the production of intermediate goods 
and R&D, this one can be encouraged either by a direct subsidy or through a subsidy to 
the production of intermediate goods. Such policies have a negative impact on the fiscal 
budget of each country and that situation may lead to adverse consequences, such as those 
prevented by the SGP.  
                                                
2 Namely using the concept of flexibility included in the set of criteria that Kopits and Symansky, 1998, 
defined for “optimal” fiscal rules.   4 
However, these policies may reduce the technological-knowledge gap between the 
two countries and, through this, increase the competitiveness of the less developed one. In 
this case, they would be fundamental for an increase in the economic convergence within 
the union and, in particular, for the economic growth performance of the poorer country, 
which could justify different fiscal rules among countries. As apparent above, this will be 
the focus of the present work. 
In any of these cases, such policies also have a bearing on the demand for labour. 
Additionally, while affecting not only the level but also the technological-knowledge gap 
between countries, they also have an impact on the relative demand for labour in each 
country and, thus, on inter-country wage inequality. This important topic of research in 
recent literature (e.g., Wood, 1998; and Aghion et al., 2003) will also be discussed, as the 
model easily allows it, although it will not be the central focus of the paper.  
By  assumption,  countries  differ  in  three  features.  The  first  feature  relates  to 
economic  dimension,  measured  by  labour  endowments:  the  one  with  higher  active 
population  is  called  Big,  the  other  one  is  called  Small.  The  second  feature  concerns 
domestic  institutions,  which  are  more  advanced  in  the  Big-country.  The  third  feature 
relates to  the  domestic quality indexes measuring technological knowledge,  which are 
higher in the Big-country. The latter feature is an endogenous consequence of the other 
two and measures the level of development of each country. 
The  paper  is  structured  as  follows.  Section  2  describes  the  model.  Section  3 
determines the equilibrium conditions. Section 4 analyses the effects of a governmental 
intervention. Finally, section 5 offers some concluding remarks. 
2. The model 
2.1. Final-goods sector   5 
Each final good n Î [0, 1] is produced by one of two countries, the Small-country, S, and 
the Big-country, B. The former (latter) brings institutions, AS (AB), and labour, LS (LB), 
together  with  a  continuum  set  of  S  (B)  specific  quality-adjusted  intermediate  goods, 
indexed by j Î [0, J] (j Î ]J, 1]). The output of n, Yn, at time t is, 
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The integrals denote the contribution of intermediate goods to production. In the 
Schumpeterian tradition, the quantity of each j, xn, used in the production of the final good 
n is quality-adjusted; i.e., the quality upgrade is q > 1, and k is the top-quality rung at time 
t. The term 1–a is the aggregate intermediate-goods input share. 
The second and fourth terms on the right-hand side of (1) can be interpreted as 
representing the role of the labour to production, respectively, in the Small-country and in 
the  Big-country.  These  terms  include  the  labour  levels  of  each  country,  where,  by 
assumption,  LB > LS.  The  term  A  is  an  exogenous  variable  representing  the  level  of 
productivity, dependent on country’s institutions. As B’s institutions are, by hypothesis, 
more  advanced,  we  consider  AB > AS > 1,  which  means  that  an  absolute  productivity 
advantage of LB over LS is accounted. A relative productivity advantage of either type is 
captured by (1-n) and n, which implies that LS (LB) is relatively more productive in final 
goods indexed by smaller (larger) ns. The parameter a Î ]0, 1[ represents the labour input 
share. 
Finally, as we  will see below, at each time t  there is a competitive equilibrium 
threshold  final  good  n ,  where  the  switch  from  one  country  to  the  other  becomes 
advantageous. An increase in  n  would mean a larger space for production in country S, 
thus appearing as a measure of its relative competitiveness. 
Due to zero profit equilibrium by producers of n Î [0, 1], the demand for the top-
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where:  pn  and  p(j)  are,  respectively,  the  prices  of  n  and  j.  A  higher  pn  increases  the 
marginal  revenue  product  of  the  factors,  encouraging  firms  to  rent  more  intermediate 
goods. A higher LS,n or LB,n implies that more labour is used with intermediate goods, 
raising demand.
3 Finally, a higher p(j) means lower demand, since the demand curve for 
intermediate goods is downward sloping.  
Plugging (2) into (1),
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are  aggregate  quality  indexes,  measuring  the  technological  knowledge  in  the  country-
specific range of intermediate goods.  
Let us define G º QB/QS. G accounts for the relative technological-knowledge level 
of the Big’s specific intermediate goods, giving an adequate measure of the technological-
knowledge gap between countries or, in other words, of the economic development gap. 
As will be shown later, an endogenous relevant result is that G
–1 < 1, as QS < QB, 
because the Small-country has less labour and worse institutions. It will also be shown that 
this result allows us to analyse whether a country specific governmental intervention may 
                                                
3 Thus,  LS,n  and  LB,n  are effectively  the  markets  for  new  technologies,  since  monopolists can  only  sell 
intermediate goods to the producers of final goods employing labour. 
4 As we will see below, the profit maximising by monopolist producers implies that p(j) is independent of j.   7 
improve the Small-country situation, thus questioning the existence of a one size fits all 
fiscal rule.
5 
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where we normalise its price at each time t to one (numeraire). Resources of the union, Y, 
that are not consumed, C, are used in the production of intermediate goods, X, and in the 
R&D sector, R; i.e., Y=X+R+C. 
2.2. Intermediate-goods sector 
Since Y is the input in the production of j Î [0, 1] and final goods are produced in perfect 
competition, the before-subsidy marginal cost of production of j Î [0, 1] is 1, regardless of 
the country. Assuming that the government of each country can subsidise the production 
of j by paying an ad-valorem fraction, zx (more specifically, zx,S in S and zx,B in B), of each 
firm’s cost, the after-subsidy marginal cost of producing j is (1-zx); i.e., (1-zx,S) in S and 
(1-zx,B) in B. 
Following Romer (1990), j embodies a costly design (created in the R&D sector), 
which is recovered if profits at each date are positive for a certain time in the future. This 
is assured by a patent law (i.e., by a system of intellectual property rights), which protects 
each leader firm’s monopoly, while at the same time, almost without costs, disseminating 
acquired technological knowledge to other firms. 
The profit-maximisation price of the monopolistic firms yields the constant over t, 
across j and for all k mark-up  ) 1 ( / ) 1 ( ) , , ( a - - = = x z p t j k p , which, with zx < a, is in fact a 
                                                
5 Alternatively, it would be possible to analyse the effects of a supranational intervention, using a common 
budget, which grants a higher level of subsidies for the less developed country in order to produce a higher 
level of economic convergence within the union.   8 
mark-up over 1. Without any change in government intervention, this mark-up is stable 
over t, across j and for all k. This symmetry is thus dictated by the way in which each j 
enters (1) and by the fact that all intermediate good producers use the same input. 
Since the leader firm is the only one legally allowed to produce the top-quality, it 
will use pricing to wipe out sales of lower quality. Depending on whether q (1–a) is 
greater  or  lesser  than  the  marginal  cost  of  production,  it  will  respectively  use  the 
monopoly pricing  ) 1 ( / ) 1 ( a - - = x z p  or the limit pricing  ) 1 ( x z q p - =  to capture all the 
market.  As  in  Grossman  and  Helpman  (1991, Ch. 4),  it  is  assumed  that  limit  pricing 
strategy is used by all firms. Since the lowest price that the closest follower can charge 
without negative profits is (1–zx), the leader can successfully capture all the market by 
selling at a price slightly below q(1–zx), because q represents the quality advantage over 
the closest follower. 
2.3. R&D sector 
The outcomes of R&D are designs, which improve the quality of intermediate goods and, 
thus, the aggregate quality indexes in (4), while creatively destroying the profits from 
previous improvement (e.g., Aghion and Howitt, 1992), as the previous best quality loses 
that status. 
In intermediate good j at time t, a firm engaged in R&D that uses y(k, j, t) flow of Y 
is successful in upgrading the next quality, k(j, t)+1, with instantaneous probability 
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- - - × × =
a z b , where:  (6) 
(i) the R&D activity is located in S (B) if 0 £ j £ J (J < j £ 1); (ii)  0 ,  
) , ( > b b
t j k q , is the 
positive learning effect of accumulated public technological knowledge from past R&D in   9 
j (e.g., Grossman and Helpman, 1991, Ch. 12;  Connolly, 2003);
6 (iii)  , ,
) , ( 1
1
0 q
t j k >
- - - z z
a  
is the adverse effect caused by the increasing complexity of quality improvements in j 
(e.g., Kortum, 1997, and Dinopoulos and Segerstrom, 2005).
7 
The positive learning effect is thus modelled in such a way that, together with the 
complexity effect, it totally offsets the positive influence of the quality rung on the profits 
of each intermediate good leader firm, as we can see below. This is the technical reason 
for the presence of the production function parameter a in (6). 
As  mentioned  earlier,  we  will  allow  any  of  the  governments  to  subsidise  R&D 
activities directly, by means of an ad-valorem subsidy zr, which can be country-specific 
(i.e., zr,S in S and zr,B in B). 
2.4. Consumers 
A  time-invariant  number  of  heterogeneous  individuals  in  the  union  (also  as  in  each 
country) – continuously indexed by a Î [0, 1] – decide the allocation of income, which is 
partly spent on consumption of the composite final good, and partly lent in return for 
future interest. For simplicity, we consider an exogenous threshold individual  a , smaller 




a B da L da L :  individuals  a a >   are  located  in  B,  whereas 
individuals  a a £  are located in S.  
The infinite horizon lifetime utility of the individual a is the integral of a discounted 
constant elasticity of substitution (CIES) utility function, 
                                                
6 It is essential to distinguish between this learning effect and the conventional learning-by-doing, which is 
usually formulated as the decline of production costs induced by the cumulative experience of production. 
7 Since the Big-country is more developed, it can be alternatively considered that 
B S S B z b z b > ; i.e., that B 
has a better innovation capacity than S.   10 
  dt t exp
t a c





















,  (7) 
where:  (i)  c(a,t)  is  the  amount  of  consumption  of  the  composite  final  good  by  the 
individual a, at time t; (ii) r > 0 is the homogeneous subjective discount rate; and (iii) 
q > 0 is the inverse of the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution. 
The budget constraint of individual a equalises income earned to consumptions plus 
savings, at each t. Savings consist of accumulation of financial assets – K, with return r –
in the form of public debt owned by individuals and in the form of ownership of the firms 
that  produce  intermediate  goods  in  monopolistic  competition.
8  The  budget  constraint, 
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t ￿ , where:  (8) 
(i) K(a, t) is thus the total asset holdings of the individual a, with return r; (ii) w(a, t) is the 
wage of the individual a, at time t; (iii) tK and tw are the ad-valorem taxes on assets and 
wages, respectively, which may be used by the government for fiscal policies purposes (in 
particular, as a means of financing, at least partially, the costs of the above mentioned 
subsidies); (iv) w and tw may differ between countries, but not tK;
9 (v) r is the same within 
the union, as a natural consequence of the monetary union.
10 
                                                
8 The value of these firms, in turn, corresponds to the value of patents in use. 
9 Note that wages are endogenously determined, while taxes are exogenous parameters. We assume that tK is 
the same in the two countries while tw may differ, as in the case of the European Union, the mobility of 
capital is largely greater than the mobility of labour, thus determining a higher degree of harmonisation in 
the case of taxation over financial assets revenues. 
10 Also note that due to arbitrage in the domestic assets market, r depends on t, but is independent from the 
type of labour   11 
Maximising  (7)  subject  to  (8)  yields  the  growth  rate  of  consumption,  which  is 
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Since, in addition, to firms and individuals, both economies can also be influenced 
by  domestic  government  policies,  in  order  to  finalise  the  characterisation  of  both 
economies, a description of the government’s budget is in order. 
2.5. Government 
In this model, the government of each country may intervene by imposing taxes on wages 
and/or on financial assets and by subsidising the production of intermediate goods and/or 
R&D activities. If necessary, the government may run a public deficit by issuing public 
debt sold to individuals.  
The budget superavit, BuS, of S and B is given respectively by: 
) ( ) ( ) ( ) (   ) , (     ) , ( ) ( ) ( )) ( 1 ( , , 0 0 , t D t r t R z t X z da t a w da t a K t r t BuS t r S S w K S S S r S S x
a a
- - - ￿ + ￿ = + t t ;  (10a) 
) ( ) ( ) ( ) (   ) , (   ) , ( ) ( ) ( )) ( 1 ( , ,
1 1
, t D t r t R z t X z da t a w da t a K t r t Bus t r B B w K B B B r B B x a a - - - ￿ + ￿ = + t t .  (10b) 
Where:  (i)  XS  (XB)  represents  the  resources  devoted  to  intermediate  goods 
production in S (B); (ii) RS (RB) represents the resources devoted to R&D in S (B); and 
(iii) DS (DB) represents the public debt in S (B). Thus, the first and second terms on the 
right-hand side represent government tax revenue from assets income and from labour 
income, respectively, while the third and fourth terms represent government expenditure 
on subsidies for intermediate goods and for R&D, respectively, and the last term relates to 
interest paid on public debt.
11 
                                                
11  We  know  that  ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( dt t D t r t Subsidies t Taxes t BuS - - - =   and  ) ( ) ( ) ( t BuS dt t D t D - - = ,  which 
gives  ) ( ) ( ) ( t BuS t D dt t D + = - , leading to equations (10a, b).   12 
We will be particularly interested in the effects of higher levels of subsidies in the 
less  developed  country,  regarding  an  eventual  convergence  towards  the  level  of 
development of the other country. Such an effect would become an argument in favour of 
different fiscal rules among countries in the union, namely a temporary authorisation for 
higher ratios between public deficit and GDP in the less developed countries. 
3. Equilibrium 
The dynamic general equilibrium resulting from optimal decentralised (laissez-faire or 
private) behaviour can be described by the path of both country-specific aggregate quality 
indexes, QS and QB, towards the steady state. 
3.1. Equilibrium for given technological knowledge 
With perfect competition in final goods, the competitive advantage of either country on 
the production of the n
th final good depends on the relative productivity related with the 
quality of national institutions, 
a / 1 ) / ( S B A A , and on the price of the country-specific labour, 
as well as on the relative productivity and prices of the intermediate goods, because of 
complementarity in production. 
The  prices  of  labour  rely  on  the  quantities,  LB  and  LS.  In  relative  terms,  the 
productivity-adjusted  quantity  of  LB  in  production  is 
1
1 1 - -
- -
S B S B L L A A
a a .  As  for  the 
productivity  and  prices  of  intermediate  goods,  they  depend  on  complementarity  with 
either labour, LB or LS, on the technological knowledge in the country-specific range of 
intermediate  goods  and  on  the  mark-up.  These  determinants  are  summed  up  in  the 
aggregate quality indexes, QB and QS, in (4).   13 
The  endogenous  threshold  final  good  n   follows  from  equilibrium  in  the  inputs 
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It  can  be  related  to  prices  bearing  in  mind  that  it  is  indifferent  to  produce  the 
threshold final good in B or S. This yields the ratio of index prices of final goods produced 
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Equation (11) shows that a higher economic development gap, G, a larger relative 
supply of labour, LB/LS, and/or a higher relative productivity concerning the quality of 
national institutions, AB/AS , results in a higher fraction of final goods produced in B, thus 
in a small  n . By (12), small  n  implies a low relative price of final goods produced by B. 
In  this  case,  the  demand  for  B  specific  intermediate  goods  is  relatively  low,  which 
discourages R&D activities aimed at improving their quality, as we can see below. 
The  equilibrium  aggregate  resources  devoted  to  intermediate-goods  production, 
X=XB+XS, and the equilibrium aggregate output, Y=YB+YS, i.e., the composite final good 
in the union (5), are expressible as a function of the currently given factor levels, 
                                                
12 This means that the competitive equilibrium threshold n , arises from: (i) profit maximisation by perfectly 
competitive producers of final goods; (ii) profit maximisation by monopolist firms producing intermediate 
goods; and (iii) full-employment equilibrium in factor markets, given the supply of labour and the current 
state of country-specific technological knowledge. Thus, B produces final goods n > n  and S produces final 
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Equation  (13b)  shows  clearly  that:  (i)  economic  growth  is  driven  by  the 
technological-knowledge progress, reflected  in the aggregate quality indexes;
13 (ii) the 
contribution of B for the composite final good is higher than the contribution of S, since, 
by assumption, LB > LS and AB > AS, and, as an endogenous result of the model, QB > QS – 
as will be shown later.
14 
The price paid for a unit of labour, w, is equal to its marginal product. From (13b), 
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.  (14) 
                                                
13 As will be shown later, in transitional dynamics towards the steady state, the growth rate is higher in the 
country with stronger technological knowledge progress. 
14 Since S is not too backward (i.e., an appropriate taxonomy for our B and S countries would be developed 
versus  developing,  rather  than  developed  versus  underdeveloped),  it  is  predictable  that  inter-country 
differences in prices of final goods are of second order. Moreover, in the context of a monetary union, with 
single currency and common market, prices of tradable goods tend to be very similar, as well as national 
inflation rates.   15 
Equation (14) shows that inter-country wage inequality grows with: (i) endogenous 
accumulation  of  technological  knowledge  by  B;  (ii)  exogenous  improvement  in  B’s 
institutions; and (iii) exogenous decrease in labour endowments of B.
15 
3.2. Equilibrium R&D 
The  expected  current  value  of  the  flow  of  profits  to  the  monopolist  producer  of 
intermediate good j, V(k, j, t),
































) 1 ( ) , (
1
) 1 ( 1
) 1 ( ) , (
1





) 1 ( ) (
) 1 ( ) 1 (
) 1 ( ) (
) 1 ( ) 1 (






















S x S , 
(15) 
in S and B, respectively; (ii) the given equilibrium interest rate; and (iii) the expected 
duration  of  the  flow,  which  is  the  expected  duration  of  the  successful  research’s 
technological-knowledge leadership. Such duration, in turn, depends on the probability of 
a successful R&D. The resulting expression for V(k, j, t) is: 
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t j k
t j k V
+
=
P .  (16) 
Hence, the expected income generated by the successful research on rung k
th at time 
t, V(k, j, t) r(t), equals the difference between profit flow, P(k, j, t), which is paid out as 
dividends, and the expected capital loss, V(k, j, t) I(k, j, t), which will occur when rung k
th 
is replaced by a new one. Thus, r + I is the effective discount rate of the successful R&D. 
Under free-entry R&D equilibrium in each country the expected returns are equal to 
resources spent, 
                                                
15 Since we consider inter-Union labour immobility, it is not possible to solve the problem of inter-country 
wage inequality through immigration from S to B. 
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where zr is a governmental ad-valorem subsidy to R&D and it can be country-specific. 
The equilibrium can be translated into the path of the technological knowledge. The 
following expression results for the equilibrium country-specific technological-knowledge 
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  (18b) 
In (18a) and (18b), the terms in large brackets are the equilibrium country-specific 
probability  of  successful  R&D,  IS  and  IB,  given  r,  pS  and  pB,  which  turns  out  to  be 
independent of j and k, due to the removal of scale of technological-knowledge effects.
17 
Equations (18a) and (18b) indicate that subsidies may improve technological knowledge 
and, through it, the country’s level of development.  
Substituting pS and pB in (18a, b) for the respective expressions in (12) and equalling 
(18a) and (18b), we find the equilibrium value of  n . After that, the equilibrium levels of 
pS and pB are also revealed. 
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17 As stated before, the positive effect of the quality rung on profits and on the learning effect is exactly 
offset by its effect on the complexity cost.   17 
Hence, (19) shows that more resources devoted to R&D in each country (and thus in 
the  union)  are  needed  to  offset  the  greater  difficulty  of  R&D  when  the  technological 
knowledge in the country-specific range of intermediate goods rises. 
3.3. Steady state 
Since the aggregate output has constant returns to scale in inputs QS and QB, and Y, X, R 
and C are all multiples of QS and QB,
18 the constant and unique steady-state endogenous 
growth rate, which through the Euler equation (9) also implies a constant steady-state 
interest rate,  ) ( * * *
B S r r r = = , designed by  ) ( * * *

















* r - c C R X Y Q Q g 1
1 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ * * * * * * *  ￿  0 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ * * * = = = = n p p G B S .  (20) 
Therefore,  * r  is obtained by setting the growth rate of consumption in (9) equal to 
the  growth  rate  of  technological  knowledge  in  (18a,  b)  and  using  the  previously 
determined equilibrium levels of pS and pB. Then,  * g  results from plugging  * r  into the 
Euler equation (9). Also from (20), we find that the inter-country wage inequality remains 
constant in steady state, since from (14)  0 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
* * * * * = = - = - G Q Q w w L H L H . 
4. Government intervention 
Now, we solve numerically the transitional dynamics towards the steady state to illustrate 
the effect of government intervention on the country-specific technological knowledge. 
The stability properties of the transitional dynamics towards the steady state are block 
recursive, in the sense that we can first determine the stability of G and then recursively 
characterise the behaviour of all the other variables.
19  
                                                
18 Note that C = Y - X - R and Y, X and R are multiples of QS and QB, then C also becomes a multiple of these 
aggregate quality indexes. 
19 We solve the model numerically because the differential equation describing the path of G is non-linear, 
also because we want to look at the path of adjustment of some fundamental variables.   18 
Using these results, we analyse whether different fiscal rules may be needed (or not) 
in order to offset divergences in development among member-countries within a monetary 
union.  We  also  check  the  path  of  inter-country  final  goods  productive  structure  and, 
complementarily, the path of inter-country wage inequality. 
Bearing in mind that r is always unique, (18a) and (18b) can be used to get the 
differential  equation  needed  to  obtain  the  path  of  the  technological-knowledge  gap 
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.  (21) 
Using the fourth-order Runge-Kutta classical numerical method, which solves (21) 
with  suitable  precision,  the  time  path  of  technological-knowledge  gap  is  displayed, 
bearing in mind the baseline parameter values and labour endowments in table 1. 
 
Table 1. Baseline values of exogenous variables and parameters 
Variables  Value    Variables  Value    Parameters  Value    Parameters  Value 
AB  1.40    LS  1.00    b  1.00    r  0.02 
AS  1.00    sx,m,sr,m  0.00    z  6.00    a  0.70 
LB  1.40    tw,m,tK  0.00    q  1.05    q  3.33 
Notes: (i) the baseline values are in line with our theoretical assumptions (for instance, 
AB>AS), Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001), Connolly and Valderrama (2005), and 
to calibrate the union growth rate around 2.5%; (ii) we consider 
S L a = = 0.42  
and  this  value  is  normalised  to  1;  (iii)  we  start  with  no  governmental 
intervention. 
 
We assume that initially G=1.40, BuS=D=0 in both countries. For simplification, 
we will assume in all built scenarios that there are no taxes: one consequence of this   19 
assumption is that there will be no effects on the budget superavit of one country resulting 
from changes in the fiscal policy of the other. 
Figure 1 below sums up the main results, by comparing paths of, respectively, (1/G), 
n  and W, under no government intervention in any country (Scenario 0 or Sc 0) with the 
ones resulting from an exogenous increase at time t = 0 of: (Scenario 1 or Sc 1) zx,S (to 
zx,S=0.1); (Scenario 2 or Sc 2) zr,S (to zr,S=0.1); (Scenario 3 or Sc 3) zx,S and zr,S (to 
zx,S=zr,S=0.1); and (Scenario 4 or Sc 4) zr,B (to zr,B=0.1). Figure 1 also displays the path 
of the public deficit to product ratio for S in scenarios 1, 2 and 3, and for B in scenario 4. 
Moreover, table 2 compares initial and final steady-state values of the main variables and 
initial and final values for the deficit to product ratio under the different scenarios. 
 
Figure 1. Transitional dynamics of: 





























c. Inter-country wage inequality, W 
 



























   20 
Table 2. Initial and final steady-state values of the main variables 
  1/G  n   W  pB  pS  r  g  (BuS/Y)B  (BuS/Y)S 
Initial  0.714  0.360  1.272  0.678  1.016  0.046  0.024  0.00  0.00 
Sc 0  0.578  0.336  1.414  0.661  1.066  0.046  0.025  0.00  0.00 
Sc 1  0.654  0.350  1.329  0.671  1.036  0.047  0.026  0.00  –0.028 
Sc 2  0.773  0.369  1.223  0.685  0.998  0.049  0.028  0.00  –0.101 
Sc 3  0.877  0.384  1.148  0.699  0.971  0.051  0.029  0.00  –0.132 
Sc 4  0.431  0.304  1.637  0.640  1.143  0.063  0.041  –0.184  0.00 
 
Our results clearly indicate that with no governmental intervention (scenario 0) the 
inter-country  technological-knowledge  gap,  1/G,  (and  thus the  divergence  in  levels  of 
economic development) would grow significantly. That would cause an increase in the 
inter-country wage inequality, W, and a decrease in the competitiveness of the small and 
less developed country, as measured by the decrease in n . 
A governmental intervention in S, by way of an increase in zx,S and/or zr,S (in relation 
to zx,B and/or zr,B, respectively), attenuates the inter-country technological-knowledge gap 
(scenario 1) or even makes it possible for S to reduce this gap (scenarios 2 and 3), as 
Figure 1a shows.  
A greater zx,S increases the size of profits that accrue to the producers of intermediate 
goods in S – see (15) –, while a greater zr,S decreases the cost of R&D in S – see (17). In 
this way; an increase in zx,S and/or zr,S boosts the incentives to do R&D in S, thereby 
increasing the growth rate of its technological knowledge, QS in (4), which in turn leads to 
a higher 1/G. Until the new steady state, such bias increases the supply of intermediate 
goods in S, thereby increasing the number of final goods produced in this country – see 
(11) and Figure 1b – and lowering their relative price at least when compared to scenario 0 
–  see  (12).  This  path  continues  towards  the  constant  new  steady-state  level  of  the 
mentioned variables, implying that 1/G is attenuated (scenario 1) or reverted (scenarios 2   21 
and 3), but at a decreasing rate until it reaches its new higher steady state level, as depicted 
in Figure 1a. 
Due to complementarity between inputs in (1), changes in W are closely related to 
the  inter-country  technological-knowledge  gap,  as  (14)  clearly  shows.  Since  the 
exogenous increase in zx,S and/or zr,S attenuates or reduces this bias, the stimulus to the 
demand for labour in S attenuates (scenario 1) or reduces (scenarios 2 and 3) the inter-
country wage inequality, as Figure 1c illustrates. 
As expected, the main adverse effect of the governmental intervention in S is a 
continuous increase in its public deficit and in the ratio between the public deficit and the 
GDP.
20 This increase is relatively under control in scenario 1, with an indirect subsidy to 
R&D  through subsidising  the  production of intermediate  goods, but  assumes too  high 
values in scenarios 2 and 3, from a certain moment of time, as Figure 1d shows. 
It  is  worth  noting  that  the  external  negative  effects  of  this  governmental 
intervention,  in  the  small  and  less  developed  country  (and  thus  the  external  negative 
effects of running public deficits in S), while in line with those expected (De Grauwe, 
2005), are of very limited importance: table 2 shows a slight increase in the price level 
index  in  B  when  compared  to  the  scenario  of  non-intervention,  and  also  in  S  when 
compared with the initial situation (and only in scenario 1); table 2 also shows a slight 
increase in  the  interest rate within the union.  In this  way, it is  possible to argue that 
financing the deficit running in the small country would have no major negative effects 
across the union. 
Finally, we use scenario 4 to compare the effects arising from the same kind of 
governmental  intervention  in  S  and  B,  allowing  us  to  highlight  the  importance  of 
economic dimension on external effects of running a (probably) excessive public deficit.  
                                                
20 Note that the values of the public deficit would be reduced if taxes were also considered.   22 
As would be expected, the growth rate of the union, g, increases more significantly 
in the case of a direct subsidy to R&D given by B.
21 However, this intervention would 
lead to an important increase in the inter-country technological-knowledge gap, as well as 
in the inter-country wage inequality, and to a significant decrease in competitiveness in 
S.
22  
External negative effects of the governmental intervention, again in line with what 
would be expected (De Grauwe, 2005), would be clearly stronger in this case, associated 
with  the  creation  of  an  excessive  public  deficit  in  B,  which  would  be  rapidly 
unsustainable, as the path of the public deficit to product ratio illustrates (Figure 1d). In 
this case, we observe a significant increase in the interest rate of the union, mainly driven 
by the need to finance an increasing public deficit, also as an important growth in the price 
level index of S. In this way, it is possible to argue that financing the deficit running in the 
big country would have major negative effects across the union. 
From the results of our model it seems to be possible to consider that: 
(i) a governmental intervention subsidising (directly or indirectly) R&D led by a small 
country in a monetary union induces external negative effects of very little significance, at 
the  same  time  generating  some  relevant  internal  effects,  namely  promoting  economic 
convergence towards the level of development of the more developed countries; 
(ii) a governmental intervention subsidising R&D led by a big country in a monetary 
union induces strong external negative effects, raising the interest rate and the price level 
                                                
21 We choose to compare directly scenarios 2 and 4, as it resulted, in scenario 2, that a direct subsidy to R&D 
would produce stronger effects on 1/G,  n  and W. In any case, the same kind of comparison would be 
possible considering a subsidy to the production of intermediate goods. 
22 The mechanism underlying these results is the same as the one explained for a governmental intervention 
in S.   23 
of  the  union,  at  the  same  time  increasing  the  economic  development  disequilibrium 
between countries, i.e., significantly reducing the desired economic and social cohesion; 
(iii) temporary differentiation of fiscal rules within the union, allowing less developed and 
small countries to have more fiscal margin for manoeuvre, arises as a valid argument, as it 
may promote social and economic cohesion with very small costs; 
(iv) in this sense, a direct subsidy to R&D works more rapidly, even allowing a decrease 
in the economic development gap, but has stronger negative effects on fiscal discipline, so 
its use should be more restricted in temporal terms; 
(v) one of the main important aspects of the recent SGP reform (European Council, 2005), 
namely the consideration of an exceptional character of some public expenses connected 
to the development of innovation and knowledge processes (thus possibly justifying an 
excessive deficit), seems to be reasonable;  
(vi) in the same way, our results point to the relevance of some criticisms made to the 
European fiscal rules, while imposed homogeneously throughout the eurozone and not 
considering  the  composition  of  public  expenses  (e.g.,  Mills  and  Quinet,  2001)  or  the 
possibility of financing public investment through the increase of public debt (e.g., Creel, 
2003). 
4. Concluding remarks 
The main purpose of this paper is to discuss one of the main questions raised by the 
emergence of the EMU, namely the existence (or not) of the same fiscal rules for different 
countries, i.e., independently of their economic dimension and level of development. In 
particular, the paper focuses on the possibility for small and less developed countries to 
run temporarily excessive deficits, in order to improve their economic development and 
the social and economic cohesion within the union.   24 
To this purpose, we develop a dynamic general-equilibrium growth model with two 
countries forming a monetary union. Growth is driven by Schumpeterian-R&D applied to 
intermediate goods which complement labour in each country. In this context, we analyse 
the  effects  of  a  governmental  intervention  through  subsidising  (directly  or  indirectly) 
R&D activities and compare them to a situation with no governmental intervention. 
An increase in this kind of subsidies in the less developed and small country, S, re-
directs R&D towards designs that improve the quality of its intermediate goods relatively 
more.  This  increases  the  productivity  of  these  intermediate  goods,  which,  in  turn, 
diminishes the perfectly competitive domestic relative prices of final goods produced in S. 
Thus,  through  the  price  channel,  the  inter-country  technological-knowledge  gap  is 
reduced,  but  at  a  decreasing  rate  until  it  reaches  its  new  steady  state.  By  connecting 
government  intervention  with  the  technological-knowledge  progress,  we  relate 
government intervention with the path of relative economic development. 
Such  an  intervention  would  lead  to  the  creation  and  increase  of  public  deficits. 
However, should they occur in a small country, their external negative effects would be of 
very little significance, while inducing some relevant internal effects, namely promoting 
economic convergence. Conversely, if an excessive deficit were run in the big country, 
strong external negative effects would occur, raising the interest rate and the price level of 
the union, and significantly reducing the level of economic and social cohesion.  
These results suggest that temporary differentiation of fiscal rules within the union, 
increasing fiscal flexibility for the less developed and small countries, would promote 
social and economic cohesion with very small costs. In particular, the consideration of an 
exceptional  character  of  some  public  expenses  connected  to  the  development  of 
innovation and knowledge processes would be justified. This result goes in line with one 
of the main important aspects of the recent SGP revision.   25 
In future research, we intend to further develop the analysis in order to consider the 
impact on our results arising from issues such as the possibility of cheaper R&D imitative 
activity  by  the  less  developed  countries,  the  (more  realistic)  existence  of  taxation  to 
attenuate  the  level  of  public  deficits,  or  the  possibility  of  positive  external  spillovers 
generated by fiscal policies.   26 
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( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ "￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ "￿0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿, ￿ > ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿ + ￿
! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 5 ￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿￿ . ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿ "￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ "￿ ￿ ￿ ￿"￿ ￿ 2 ￿ ￿￿   ￿￿, ￿ > ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿ 3 ￿
! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿, 0 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿5 ￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿! ￿ ￿ ￿"￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿# ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿4 ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿￿
, ￿ > ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 4 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ( 0 ￿ 5 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ "￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ "￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ "￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ "￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿, ￿ > ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 4 ￿ ￿ - ￿ ; ￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ?￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
& ￿ ￿ ; ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .￿ ; ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿ "￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ,￿ # # ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ & ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ,￿ # # ￿ ￿￿, ￿ > ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ 0 ! 0 ￿1 ￿ ￿ 2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿8 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿9 : ; < = ,> ? ? = @ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ $ ￿ ￿1￿ ￿ 2 ￿ ￿ & ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ "￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ) ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 5 6 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿7 7 ￿
& ￿ .￿ ￿ ￿ ￿! ￿ ￿ @ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿4 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿! & & ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ) ￿ ￿￿ ,￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ & ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ) ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿# ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿7 ￿￿
& ￿ .￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿ @ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 4 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 4 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿ .￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿ 5 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ * ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿"￿ ￿ 2 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ # ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ) ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿   ￿! ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿"￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ & ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿ "￿ ￿ ￿ "￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿ "￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿ A ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿7 ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿, * - ￿ .￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ 0 ! 0 ￿1 ￿ ￿ 2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿3 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ & ￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿# ￿ ￿ "￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿￿< ￿ ￿ ￿ .> ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ) ￿
￿￿￿￿7 ￿ ￿ & - ￿ 6 / ￿ ￿ ￿ A 0 ￿ < ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ - ’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 5 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 4 ￿ 6 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿& ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 2 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿ "￿ ￿ ￿￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ & ,￿ ￿ ￿ # # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ "￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
< ￿ ￿ ￿ .> ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ) ￿
￿￿￿￿7 ) ￿
4 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ @ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿A ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ". ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ # ￿( ￿ "￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 2 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿ 3 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ < ￿ ￿ ￿ .> ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ) ￿
￿￿￿￿7 + ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ B ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ %( ￿ ￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 5 ￿ - ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ & ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ "￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ # ￿3 ￿ "￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿7 ￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿B ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ .> ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ) ￿
￿￿￿￿7 3 ￿
9 : ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿4 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿& ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿4 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿! ￿ ￿ .￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿! ￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿5 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿% "￿
￿ ￿ ￿ 2 ￿ ￿ & ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿C # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ A ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ "￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ "￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ .> ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ) ￿
￿￿￿￿7 ￿￿
￿ ￿ - C ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ .￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , * - ￿ .￿ ￿ ( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ = ￿ ￿￿ 0 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ "￿ ￿ ￿   ￿ ￿ ￿ "￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿ "￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ "￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿￿￿B ￿ - ￿ > ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ) ￿
￿￿￿￿7 ￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , * - ￿ .￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ / ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 0 ! 0 ￿ 1 ￿ ￿ 2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ 3 ￿ ￿ "￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ "￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿! ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ # ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ "￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ # ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ & ￿￿ "￿ ￿ & ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿B ￿ - ￿ > ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ) ￿
￿￿￿￿7 ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ %￿ ￿ %& ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ’ ￿ %( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 4 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ) ￿ ￿
$ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ $ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ "￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ $ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ "￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ % ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ( ￿ ￿ ￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
B ￿ - ￿ > ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ) ￿
￿￿￿￿￿7 ￿
4 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿! ￿ ￿ .￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿! ￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿5 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿! ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ "￿ ￿ ￿4 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ . ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 2 ￿ ￿ & ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿ 2 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ "￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ # ￿￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ,￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿B ￿ - ￿ > ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ) ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ; ￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 4 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿"￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ) ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ / $ 3 ( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ # ￿ ￿ "￿ ￿ & & ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
& ￿ 6 - ￿ .> ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ) ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 0 ￿ ! 0 ￿ 1 ￿ ￿ 2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ * ￿ "￿ ￿ ￿ 3 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
0 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ & ￿ ,D ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ "￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿( ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ 2 ￿ ￿￿ ￿( ￿ # # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿   ￿￿￿ ￿ ; ￿ ￿ - ￿￿￿ ￿ ) ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ; ￿ ￿￿0 ￿& 0 ￿5 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿￿D ￿ ￿ "￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ "￿ ￿# ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿ ￿"￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ & ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ & ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ "￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ,￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
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